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Abstract
This paper provides a microeconometric analysis of labour force participation elasticities
in Slovakia where we study the elasticity with respect to a unique tax reform whereby
the flat tax was backtracked and replaced by a progressive tax. By estimating a probability
model for labour force participation, we show that the low-skilled and females are groups
that are particularly responsive to changes in income taxes and transfers. We perform a
microsimulation analysis of two scenarios of flat-tax regime abolishment. We find that the
recent departure from the flat-tax system in Slovakia in 2013, which introduced
two tax brackets in personal income taxation, only negligibly reduced the average
probability of being economically active at the extensive margin. A more significant
average effect has been found in a hypothetical scenario with a similar fiscal revenue
impact, simulating a departure from the flat-tax system by reintroducing five tax brackets.
We show the different impacts of the two distinct scenarios of abolishing the flat tax on
selected subgroups of the population.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the link between labour force participation and changes in
the tax system. As argued by Meghir and Phillips (2010), the impact of taxation
on work incentives is one of the principal sources of inefficiency that may arise in
a tax system. The fundamental issue is to assess how sensitive individuals’ work
incentives are to changes in taxes and benefits. An analysis of labour supply
behaviour is therefore a key element when evaluating the reforms of tax and
transfer systems and the impact of different policies on changes in tax revenues,
employment, and wealth redistribution.
The way how labour force participation responds to the work incentive/disincentive
effects of taxation and welfare programmes has attracted a lot of interest in both
labour and public economics, and extensive research has resulted in numerous empir-
ical results. For an overview of the literature that connects labour supply to income
taxes and social benefits, see, among others, surveys by Meghir and Phillips (2010),
Moffitt (2002), and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
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In this paper, a case study of the recent moving away from the flat-tax system in
Slovakia is performed. The idea of introducing a flat-tax regime was widespread among
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, including Slovakia, at the beginning of
the 2000s. Effective from 2004, the system of graduated personal income tax rates in
Slovakia was simplified to a flat-tax rate of 19%. Only a few EU countries abandoned
the flat tax and returned to the more progressive system by reintroducing tax brackets.
These countries currently include Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Using the detailed
microsimulation model and estimates of participation decisions (labour supply elastici-
ties at the extensive margin), we quantify the effects of the tax system reform valid
from 2013 that resulted in a marginal move away from the flat tax and to a positive
first-round fiscal effect leading to an increase in revenues by 0.4% of GDP. This reform
has been characterized by the re-introduction of two tax brackets and the unification
(and increase) of the assessment basis for different social and health insurance contri-
butions. In addition, we perform a simulation of the counterfactual scenario abolishing
the flat-tax regime by introducing five tax brackets. In broad terms, this scenario simu-
lates the personal income tax system valid in Slovakia before the flat-tax reform in
2004. By simulating these two scenarios with the same simulated first-round revenue
effect, we show that the departure from a flat tax can have a different impact on
selected population subgroups.
The literature on the microeconometric estimations of labour supply elasticities is
vast. A comprehensive overview in relation to the progress in the field of microsimula-
tion models focused on labour supply, and methodological approaches can be found in
Aaberge and Colombino (2014), who identify three main methodologies that have been
adopted for modelling labour supply. A so-called reduced form approach embodies the
hypothesis that labour supply (namely the observed hours of work) is a function of an
exogenous net wage and net income. In general, it is not a precise representation of
dependence, mainly due to the non-linearities of budget constraint. Moreover, corner
solutions are usually ignored. The structural “marginalist” approach works with the
conditions for a constrained maximum of the utility function; see, among others, a
presentation of the methodology by Hausman (1981). The solution is obvious when
convex budget sets and a consumption-leisure setup in the utility function are assumed.
However, the method tends to be cumbersome if more complicated non-convex budget
constraints are formulated. As a response, a discrete choice framework based on the
concept of a “random utility maximization” presents an often-used alternative. This
approach, introduced originally by van Soest (1995), has become rather standard in
recent years. The utility maximization problem of individuals is reduced to a choice
among a discrete set of options (yielding different utilities) such as working full time,
working part time, or not working at all. Being inactive thus presents one of the alter-
natives, and the extensive and intensive margins could be directly estimated so that
labour supply decisions could be evaluated even in the presence of non-convexities in
budget constraints.
Currently, a number of empirical studies conclude that an extensive margin is much
more important than an intensive one. Existing studies usually evaluate labour supply
elasticities of some special demographic subgroups (e.g. single individuals, married
women, and couples). They usually find that wage elasticities are larger for women than
for men. Looking at the magnitude of the estimated elasticities, the variation of the
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results found in the literature is sizeable. As noted by Bargain et al. (2014), differences
across studies arise due to the distinct methodologies applied, including the underlying
datasets used (administrative versus survey data) as well as the periods of study. An
overview of recent estimates of labour supply elasticities in the US economy can be
found in Chetty et al. (2013) and in McClelland and Mok (2012). For an overview of
recent empirical evidence on labour supply elasticities in Europe and the USA, see
Bargain et al. (2014). A brief survey and critique of different methods of the estimation
of labour force participation elasticities can also be found in Heim (2008). However,
despite the multitude of methodologies and information covered by existing studies,
analyses focusing on CEE countries are rather scarce, and the case of Slovakia has been
covered only in one paper so far. Chase (1995) compared labour force participation and
wage elasticities between the communist and post-communist regimes in Slovakia and
the Czech Republic. He showed that women’s participation in the labour market was
higher under communism and concluded that the effects of changes in earnings are
smaller in Slovakia compared to the Czech Republic. This is probably a result of the
slower transformation of the Slovak economy.
Looking at countries bordering Slovakia, Benczur et al. (2014) studied the labour
supply at the extensive margin in Hungary. They modified an existing structural ap-
proach originally proposed by Hausman (1981) by taking the effects of the tax and
benefit system directly into account. As regards the participation decision, they showed
that wages, taxes, and transfers have a stronger influence on the participation decision
of individuals that are older, low-skilled, married women, or women of child-bearing
age. Galuscak and Katay (2014) followed the same methodology and provided empirical
estimates for the Czech Republic, which are close to those reported for Hungary.
Another analysis focused on the Czech Republic was performed by Bicakova et al.
(2011), who provided estimates of participation probabilities separately for males and
females by using a probit model. Compared to the study by Galuscak and Katay (2014),
the estimated wage semi-elasticities of labour supply are substantially smaller, even
though they are larger for women compared to men.
Our estimates of participation elasticities are based on a model of labour supply
where both taxes and social transfers are simultaneously taken into account. We
estimate a labour supply model following the methodological approach introduced by
Benczur et al. (2014). The behavioural response is based on the rationale of utility
maximization, and using the classification provided by Aaberge and Colombino (2014),
it can be seen as a “marginalist” approach. The model covers in minute detail the joint
effects of tax and benefit systems on individuals’ net income. Using this modelling
strategy, individual participation probabilities are determined by comparing incomes in
two states: being in the labour force and being out of it. A key component of this ap-
proach is to precisely evaluate the disposable income of an individual, including non-
labour income and social transfers received by a household in both states. In order to
do so, the concept of the gains to work of an individual is introduced and defined as
the difference between the net wage and the amount of welfare benefits lost due to
taking up a full-time job.
Employing this microeconometric method allows us to evaluate how the Slovak tax-
benefit system can affect work incentives at the extensive margin. We document that
participation probabilities are generally dependent on the level of net income and
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non-labour income, including social transfers. We find that a 1% increase in gains to
work increases the probability of economic activity by 0.08 percentage points for males
and 0.12 percentage points for females. Our findings are broadly in line with the results
usually reported in the literature that frequently demonstrate that elasticities are large
for women and very small for men. Taking into account tax and transfer system details
valid from 2010 to 2012, a 1% increase in non-labour income decreases the probability
of labour force participation by 0.04 percentage points for both genders. Policy initia-
tives likely to increase financial incentives to work should result in higher participation
rates. Our results also show that, in line with findings for other countries, the low-
skilled and females are the groups that are particularly responsive to changes in taxes
and transfers.
A major advantage of this method is that it allows an ex ante assessment of the counter-
factual tax and transfer system reforms and permits an evaluation of specific government
interventions and policies. The essential part of this modelling approach is the SIMTASK
module, a microsimulation model of the Slovak tax and transfer system described in detail
in Siebertova et al. (2016). This tool enables us to simulate individual tax liabilities and
benefit entitlements in detail according to valid legislation or hypothetical reform.
Labour supply models are extensively used in the literature to assess the effects of
proposed tax system reforms. In such studies, the (hypothetical) introduction of a flat
income tax and its impact on the supply of labour is frequently analysed, for example,
Decoster et al. (2010) studied the introduction of a flat tax in Belgium and found that a
flat-tax system could potentially increase labour supply. The introduction of linear
taxation in Germany was examined in Beninger et al. (2006) and Fuest et al. (2008).
Beninger et al. compared the effects in a computed manner by using a unitary and
collective labour supply model. Fuest et al. used a behavioural microsimulation model
and concluded that flat-tax reform could potentially increase employment although the
magnitude of the increase was very small. Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2010) ana-
lysed the Russian flat-tax reform of 2001 by using the difference-in-difference regres-
sion approach. As a reaction to tax changes, they identified an increase in the
distribution of hours worked and that the reform increased the probability of finding a
job. Compared to the studies mentioned above, we perform a kind of “reverse” analysis
where we study the effects of departure from the flat-tax system. In our setup, the
baseline is the flat-tax system valid in 2012 in Slovakia and we study the effects of
reintroducing the tax brackets. By performing a microsimulation analysis of two scenar-
ios, we show that a different way of moving away from the flat-tax system may have a
different impact on labour supply decisions. We find that the recent departure from
the flat-tax system in Slovakia effective from 2013 slightly reduced the average prob-
ability of being economically active. Although the hypothetical scenario of the abolition
of the flat-tax system would have a higher average impact on the probability of being
economically active, we show that the impact on participation probabilities in the two
scenarios differs for selected population subgroups.
In our analysis, we investigate the immediate or “day-after” effects of two reforms. A
long-run general equilibrium analysis will be performed in a separate paper, since the
discussion and execution of these issues is beyond the scope of the present study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section provides an overview
of the developments in the Slovak labour market and briefly describes the reforms to
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the tax-benefit system; Section 3 presents the modelling approach that was employed in
this article; Section 4 follows with a data description and definition of variables used in the
model; Section 5 depicts a short introduction of the Slovak tax and benefit system; Section
6 discusses the main results on estimated labour supply elasticities and provides tax reform
simulations; and Section 7 offers a conclusion. In the Appendix, we list the definitions
of the main variables and present the detailed results of our estimations.
2 Labour market outcomes and policies in Slovakia
The empirical evidence on labour supply behaviour in transition and post-transition
countries is limited. From the historical point of view, labour force participation was
obligatory in the CEE countries that experienced communist regimes. In general, after
the change of regimes at the beginning of the 1990s and during the transition period,
when national economies changed from planned to market-based ones, a continual
withdrawal from the labour force was detected in labour markets in all CEE countries.
Participation and employment rates in Slovakia reached their lowest in the early
2000s. Later, in the period of economic growth, an increase in both rates was observed;
they started to decline again in 2009 as a consequence of the global economic crisis.
The situation in post-transition Slovakia to 2012 can be characterized by participation
rates (see Fig. 1) being permanently below the EU-27 average but still somewhat high
compared to Hungary and Poland. Low activity rates in Slovakia persist, especially for
labour market entrants and for individuals with low qualifications. Participation rates of
the youth and low-skilled (low-educated) workers are excessively low, even compared
to neighbouring countries (see Fig. 2).
The Slovak tax-benefit system experienced major changes over the last decade. Both
tax and social transfer systems were considerably modified1 in 2004, when Slovakia
became the first among Central European countries to implement a flat income tax
scheme. It followed the cases of the Baltic States, where the flat tax was introduced in
the mid-1990s and Russia in 2001. Afterwards, other CEE countries also followed this
flat-tax track, among them Ukraine (in 2004); Georgia and Romania (in 2005); Albania,
Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic (in 2008); Bosnia and Herzegovina (in 2009); and
Hungary (in 2011). As in most of the mentioned countries, the implementation of the
19% flat income tax (both personal and corporate) in Slovakia was supplemented by
additional reform changes, including the modified definition of the tax base, social and
Fig. 1 Participation rates in Slovakia and selected countries, 1998–2012
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health insurance contributions, indirect taxation (the VAT rate was unified at 19%),
and tax administration. In countries with established market economies (like those in
Western Europe), there was not such a strong requirement for overall reforms as there
was in transition countries, and as a consequence, the demand for the introduction of
the flat tax has not been so appealing. As pointed out by Fuest et al. (2008), flat-tax
reform is unlikely to take place in Germany due to its questionable distributional im-
pact and limited efficiency effects. After the economic crisis, most countries needed to
increase their revenues due to growing deficits, and increasing taxes, whether income
or indirect, looked like an appealing tool. Currently, most of the CEE countries that
introduced flat-tax regimes still use them. However, Ukraine abandoned the flat tax in
2011. Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Montenegro returned back to the progressive
system in 2013 by introducing a second tax bracket in the personal income tax scheme.
It is noteworthy that the threshold for the higher tax rate in both Slovakia and the
Czech Republic is sufficiently high and only applies to a small fraction of taxpayers in
both countries.
In Slovakia, the levels of social transfers were also effectively significantly cut from
2004 in order to increase work incentives. A report conducted by the World Bank
(2012) has shown that these reforms have considerably improved work incentives for
low-income workers. However, this improvement has mainly been achieved due to a
reduction in transfer levels. The tax-benefit system currently valid in Slovakia seems to
encourage work more than the system valid before reforms in 2004. On the other hand,
low-wage part-time work is still not sufficiently attractive for those who are eligible to
receive the material needs benefit. The Slovak transfer system is restrictive especially
for labour market entrants and low-skilled workers employed in low-paid jobs.
Structural changes both in the tax and transfer systems that followed from 2005 to
2012 were minor and are well documented in Porubsky et al. (2013).
3 Methodology
In this section, we set up the microeconometric model of labour supply behaviour. We
present an approach where taxes and transfers are explicitly taken into account. This
extension of the standard labour supply model leads to the specification of a probit
model that relates labour participation probabilities to the gains to work from working
full time, non-labour income, and other individual characteristics. Finally, we show that
participation elasticities can be derived analytically when using this methodology.
Fig. 2 Participation rates by education and age in 2012
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3.1 A specification of the model of participation decision
The labour supply decision of individuals is usually modelled as a utility maximization
problem formulated as a consumption-leisure trade-off2:
max
c;l
u c; 1−lð Þ ð1Þ
subject to the budget constraint
cþ w 1−lð Þ ¼ wþNY; ð2Þ
where c stands for consumption, w is wage, l is labour, and NY is other non-labour
income, including the income of other household members and government transfers.
Note that the budget constraint includes the disposable income of the whole house-
hold; thus, the income of other members also affects the labour supply decision of an
individual. The total time endowment between work and leisure is normalized to 1, so
(1 − l) denotes leisure. Using this modelling framework, taxes regulate the decision to
supply labour through their impact on net market wages and non-labour net income.
When employing the standard utility function3 characterized by strictly positive
marginal utilities, the optimality condition is determined by first-order conditions:wu
0
c
c; 1−lð Þ ¼ u01−l c; 1−lð Þ. An individual will participate if the utility from working will ex-
ceed the utility from not working. In this theoretical framework, non-participation in
work results from the corner solution of the model (Hausman, 1981). Note that if an
individual does not work, the optimal consumption equals c =NY. The reservation
wage is the lowest wage rate at which the worker will be willing to accept a particular




u 0c NY; 1ð Þ
¼ NYψχ:
ð3Þ
An individual takes up a job if the offered wage exceeds his reservation wage w ≥wres,
or put differently, logw ≥ ψlogNY + logχ. Assume that individuals differ in their prefer-
ences so that relation logχ i ¼ Z
0
iαþ εi holds. Zi is a vector of observable preferences
that affect an individual decision to work, and εieN 0; σ2ε
 
is the error term independently
and normally distributed among individuals. Given the assumption of the normality of the
error term, the probability that an individual supplies labour can be estimated using the
standard probit specification
Pr activityi ¼ 1
  ¼ Φ γ logwi þ Z0iα−ψlogNY i
 
; ð4Þ
where Φ(∙) stands for the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
The early generation of static models of labour supply, represented essentially by the
approach of Hausman (1981), were capable of only partially representing the effects of
tax and transfer policies on household budget sets. Relying on tangency conditions, the
Hausman model is restricted to the case of (piecewise) linear and convex budget sets.
As argued by Benczur et al. (2014), this assumption is particularly restrictive if certain
benefits expire immediately after taking up a job and the wage earned for the first few
hours does not reward this discrete downward jump in transfers.
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In the next step, we methodologically follow the approach presented in Benczur et al.
(2014). Adding taxes and social transfers to the model leads to a redefinition of the res-
ervation wage at the cost of the participation decision of an individual needing to be
constrained to a full-time job. The participation decision is defined by comparing the
utility derived from working full time and the utility from being inactive and receiving
full social transfers. Taking into account the corresponding budget constraints, estimat-
ing the probability of being economically active yields a probit equation.
Considering the binomial probit can be supported by the fact that in Slovakia the
most typical form of employment is full-time employment. As is shown by statistics
from Eurostat, Slovakia is a country with one of the lowest shares of workers in Europe
who are employed part time. In 2012, the share of part-time workers was only 4% as
opposed to 20% in the EU-27 on average.4 A similar situation has been documented in
Hungary and the Czech Republic.
To derive formal expressions, we first introduce the concept of the gains to work
(or effective net wage) variable GTWi of the individual i, defined as the annual net
wage wi minus the difference between social benefits if not working and social
benefits if working:
GTWi ¼ bwi− SBNW−SBW
  ¼ bwi−ΔSB; ð5Þ
where the term in parentheses expresses the amount of social benefits lost when
working and the net wage bwi is computed from the predicted gross wage. Since income
from employment is naturally unobservable for those who are unemployed or inactive,
we use Heckman’s sample selection methodology (Heckman, 1979) to predict gross
wages.5 In order to obtain a consistent vector of gains to work GTW and reduce the
division bias, we use the predicted values of gross wages for every individual in our
sample (also for the employed), as this is common in the labour supply literature: see,
for example, Bargain et al. (2014) and Breunig and Mercante (2010). To construct the
vector GTW, a microsimulation tool is needed. The SIMTASK tax and benefit calcula-
tor is used to compute net wages from gross wages and simulate the amount of social
benefits an individual is entitled to when working (SBW) and when not working
(SBNW), taking into account the individual’s characteristics as well as the characteristics
of the corresponding household. In our implementation, considering the details of the
tax and transfer system, social benefits that enter the variable GTW include the means-
tested material needs benefit and its supplements allocated at the household level.6
The second variable of principal interest to us is the non-labour income NYi of the
individual i, which is defined as a sum of three components, namely the social benefits
that an individual is entitled to when not working, the non-labour income of all house-
hold members (including individual i), and the net labour income of other members of
the household. Non-labour income covers pensions, income from property, dividend
payments, and family-related benefits (eligibility does not depend on whether a parent
works or not) and the unemployment benefit (we assume that this transfer does not
affect the decision to work—it is a contributory benefit and expires after 6 months).
Note that the construction of the variable NYi also needs a microsimulation tool.
Using the notation of the standard labour supply model presented above, the budget
constraint of an individual that does not work can be written as follows: c =NY, 1 − l = 1,
and the utility is given as u(NY, 1). When working full time (l*), the budget
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constraint can be expressed as c = wl* − ΔSB + NY, 1 − l = 1 − l* and the correspond-
ing utility as u(GTW +NY, 1 − l*).
An individual will decide to work if the utility from working exceeds the utility from
not working:
u GTW þ NY; 1 − lð Þ ≥ u NY; 1ð Þ ð6Þ
Benczur et al. (2014) show that by linearizing the left-hand-side expression in Eq. (6),
one obtains
GTW ≥
u NY; 1ð Þ − u NY; 1 − lð Þ
u0c NY; 1 − l
ð Þ ð7Þ
Applying the additively separable utility function and taking the logarithm in the
previous expression leads to the inequality that describes an individual’s decision to
work as
logGTW − ψlogNY − logχ ≥ ε: ð8Þ
Conditional on the assumption of the normally distributed error terms, the probabil-
ity that an individual is economically active (and works full time) can be estimated
using the probit specification, which is a modified version of Eq. (4):
Pr activityi ¼ 1





As noted by Galuscak and Katay (2014), this specification can be understood as a dis-
cretized version of the standard Hausman (1981) approach.
3.2 Participation (semi-)elasticities
Being an advantage of this approach, income elasticities in the presented labour supply
model can be derived analytically. Notice that since the probit model is non-linear, the
point estimates of the coefficients do not indicate the marginal effects of a unit change
in the corresponding variables. To compute the marginal impact of a percentage
change in gains to work, the probit function given by (9) should be evaluated at certain
vectors Z and log NY.
Since we evaluate the probability of economic activity, and our wage measure gains
to work is given in a natural logarithm, note that we are actually evaluating semi-
elasticities.7 To calculate the corresponding income elasticities, one has to divide the
computed semi-elasticities by the predicted probability of economic activity.8
In the probit model of labour force participation, the effect of gains to work is dir-
ectly evaluated. The separate impact of change in the net wage (w) that represents an
own-wage semi-elasticity can be derived as follows:
∂logGTW
∂ logw
¼ ∂ log w−ΔSBð Þ
∂ logw
¼ ∂ log e








Using the previous relationship, we find that the net wage semi-elasticity of the prob-
ability of supplying labour can be expressed as
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¼ γ̂φ ⋅ð Þ w
w − ΔSB
ð11Þ
where φ(∙) denotes the standard normal density function.
4 Data
The following part describes the datasets used for econometric estimation. We define the
setup of the estimation sample and the construction of variables that are of interest.
4.1 Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
The data used for the microeconometric analysis come from three waves (2010–2012)
of the SK-SILC (Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), the national version of
the EU-SILC. Data have been collected on an annual basis since 2004 by the Statistical
Office of the Slovak Republic on behalf of Eurostat. We have decided to limit the time
span of our analysis to the period after 2009, when the global economic crisis spread to
Slovakia. In 2010, the economy recovered and the period of stable economic growth
(2.8% on average) and slightly negative output gap (−0.8% on average) began. In this
period, no structural change or major shift in the labour market’s functioning was ob-
served. The dataset contains cross-sectional data on household and individual level and
provides information on income, living conditions, social exclusion, and poverty. The
original datasets contain information on more than 15,000 individuals and 5200 house-
holds annually. We combined these three datasets into a pooled cross-section, and we
estimated probit models of participation decisions as a pooled regression.
The SK-SILC comprises detailed information describing the personal characteristics
of individuals. These include age, gender, education, region of permanent residency,
and marital status. The dataset also reports detailed information related to labour mar-
ket status—whether individuals were employed (full time, part time), self-employed, or
unemployed in the reference period. Information on the length of working history (in
years) is also available. Furthermore, extensive information on the structure of individ-
ual income is available. Survey participants were asked to declare their yearly gross
earnings from employment (self-employment), fringe benefits, and transfers from the
state: including family-related benefits, unemployment benefits, and pensions (for old
age or disability). A further description and a summary of statistics of variables can be
found in Tables 7 and 8 in the Appendix.
The dataset we use in the econometric estimation is restricted by age to people older
than 15 to exclude children in compulsory education. The average retirement age was
61 in Slovakia in 2012; those receiving old-age pensions may still participate in paid
work, but the majority of individuals older than 75 do not receive a paid income and
do not participate in the labour market. Thus, we restricted the sample to persons
younger than 75 years of age. However, when computing the household income and
household social benefits, the whole dataset is considered. We do not exclude the self-
employed from the estimation sample, although they are not usually considered in the
majority of analyses due to data unrepresentativeness. Our decision not to exclude
those declaring income from self-employment is based on two perspectives. Firstly, a
number of individuals declare income from both employment and self-employment,
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and we take this into account in our microsimulation model when simulating the
amount of tax due. Secondly, in our model of labour force participation, we explicitly
model decision-making at the household level; if the declared income from self-
employment is not considered, this may lead to bias in results. We left out of the
estimation sample those individuals whose prevailing economic activity in the income
reference period could not be defined. By applying these adjustments, the original
sample is reduced by almost 18% and we are left with nearly 38,000 individual observa-
tions in the pooled sample.
4.2 A definition of variables in the model
We first focus on the definition of economic activity that serves as a dependent variable
in the probit model. For the definition of labour market status, we use the SILC vari-
able of “prevailing activity in the income reference period”, which comprises the
categories of the employed, the unemployed, children, pensioners, and those who are
otherwise inactive. Economically active people encompass those who declared them-
selves as employed or unemployed (in terms of the ILO definition of economic activ-
ity); the category of inactive people consists of children, pensioners, and those who are
otherwise inactive. However, those pensioners and students who have declared a
positive labour income are considered in our model to be employed, and their influence
on labour force participation probability is controlled by using dummy variables.
Income variables are necessary to generate gains to work; those which are collected
on the individual level are listed in gross terms on a yearly basis in SK-SILC. The only
exception is the net profit (loss) from self-employment. Information on disposable in-
come, income taxes, and social security contributions are only available in the SK-SILC
database as an aggregate at the household level. Therefore, all income variables are
used in gross terms and the net income is simulated.
Actually, we distinguish between three different types of income: labour income,
non-labour income, and transfers from the government. Labour income includes gross
wages from a main and second job, income from self-employment, income from
company shares, and income from agreement contracts (temporary employment con-
tracts). Information on fringe benefits, severance and termination payments, and a
company car is also available. Non-labour income covers income from the rental of
property or land, interest, dividends, and profit from capital investments. Transfers
involve pensions (old age and disability), means-tested benefits (such as the
material needs benefit), contributory benefits (unemployment and maternity), and
family-related benefits.
5 A microsimulation model of the tax-benefit system
In short, we describe the tax and benefit system valid in Slovakia. As the system is
highly complex, we focus on substantial parts and discuss its major attributes. In
addition, we present a newly developed microsimulation tax and benefit module.
5.1 The Slovak tax and benefit system
The Slovak tax and benefit system is largely unified, and all important components are
set at the central level. Individuals are subject to personal income tax (PIT), and the
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joint taxation of couples is not permitted. Tax is levied on gross income from different
sources including wages from employment, self-employment income, fringe benefits,
capital income (dividends excluded), rental income, and interest income. Social and
health insurance contributions are exempt from the tax base, which is given as the
gross earnings net of paid social and health insurance contributions. The tax law allows
for deductions from the tax base, and these include a basic tax allowance, spouse tax
allowance, employee tax credit, and child tax credit. Every individual can apply for the
basic tax allowance—the amount is based on the legally defined minimum subsistence
level, and a progressive reduction in its amount applies when earnings exceed the
threshold value. If the earnings of a spouse are under a certain level, the taxpayer may
be entitled to a spouse tax allowance. An employee tax credit is targeted at low-income
groups who pay health and social insurance contributions. One spouse may claim a
child tax credit, which is an allowance for every child in the household. Income tax is
calculated by applying the appropriate tax rate schedule to the tax base. From 2004 to
2012, the PIT was set at a 19% flat rate; from 2013, tax brackets were re-introduced
and a 25% rate was applied to incomes exceeding the threshold. However, this thresh-
old is sufficiently high; thus, the higher tax rate affects less than 2% of employees.
Social and health insurance payments are split between employers and employees.
From 2013, the assessment bases for the social and health insurance contributions of
employees were unified; before then, they differed based on the type of insurance and
employment contract. The assessment base for contributions differs from the base for
the computation of the PIT and has a maximum level (i.e. there is a ceiling in paid con-
tributions). Social insurance payments by employers and employees consist of un-
employment, sickness, disability, and old-age insurance, but the two categories pay
different percentages from the social insurance assessment base. Besides this, employers
contribute to a reserve solidarity fund, accident insurance, and guarantee insurance.
The Slovak benefits system comprises three components, and every component con-
sists of several programmes. Contributory benefits cover various pensions (e.g. for
senior citizens, the disabled, the bereaved, and orphans), the sickness benefit, maternity
benefit, and unemployment insurance benefit. The social assistance programme
includes the material needs benefit, which is a means-tested transfer provided to
families to provide them with a basic living standard if their income is below the mini-
mum subsistence level. The third component is the state social support programme,
which includes several family-related benefits (e.g. a child-birth grant, child benefit, and
parental allowance). Eligibility for these transfers does not depend on the contribution
history and is not means-tested.
5.2 SIMTASK: a microsimulation model of the Slovak tax-benefit system
The SIMTASK microsimulation model is a tool that can simulate individual tax li-
abilities and benefit entitlements according to policy rules. It has been built on the
existing Slovak tax and transfer microsimulation model developed and maintained
by the EUROMOD team at the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the
University of Essex. In SIMTASK, several modules of the baseline EUROMOD
model were customized and enlarged in order to achieve the highest precision in
policy simulation. The development of the model and validation tests of the
Senaj et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:19 Page 12 of 26
simulations are comprehensively documented in a related paper by Siebertova et al.
(2016). Simulations cover direct taxes (namely labour and capital income taxes)
and health and social insurance contributions paid by employees, employers, and
the self-employed. Selected transfers—the unemployment benefit, material needs
benefit, and family-related transfers (the child-birth grant, child benefit, and paren-
tal allowance)—are also simulated.
6 Findings
In this section, we present the labour force participation elasticities estimated for the
small and open Slovak economy. The results are shown for different educational, age,
and income groups as well as for the full sample. On top of that, we make use of the
estimated models to carry out simulations of two tax reform scenarios.
6.1 Labour force participation elasticities
Equipped with the vectors of gains to work logGTW and non-labour income logNY
that are constructed using a microsimulation model, we estimate the probit model of
labour force participation decision given by Eq. (9). The estimation sample is a pooled
dataset over 3 years (2010–2012) constructed with the intention to include only the
post-crisis waves of the SILC survey. The model is estimated separately for males
and females. The point estimates and the goodness-of-fit measure pseudo R2 are
listed in Table 9 in the Appendix. Reported standard errors are bootstrapped (5000
replications).
In general, the estimates of parameters are in line with the usual findings; the signifi-
cance and direction of dependencies is similar to those described for the selection
equation of the Heckman model that we have used for the prediction of gross wages.
Having a higher education and living with an economically active partner increases the
probability of economic activity. In order to capture the effect of parenthood, two
dummy variables corresponding to child-age categories are included (up to 3 years and
over 3 years of age). The age of a child up to 3 years should catch the effect of paid par-
ental allowance. It turns out that being a mother of a small child younger than 3 years
of age significantly decreases the probability of being economically active; when having
a child older than 3 years of age, the effect becomes positive. However, being the father
of a small child of an arbitrary age significantly increases activity. Reporting chronic ill-
ness, being a student, or being a pensioner proved to have a significant negative effect
on the probability of activity.
In Table 1, we report our main results: the average marginal effects from the probit
model of labour force participation. Since our income measures of gains to work and
Table 1 Average marginal effects—the main specification
Females Males
dy/dx Std err dy/dx Std err
Gains to work (logGTW) 0.118 0.011 0.081 0.009
Non-labour income (logNY) −0.039 0.004 −0.036 0.003
Net wage (w) 0.129 0.013 0.087 0.011
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors, 5000 replications
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non-labour income are given in natural logarithms, note that in fact we are evaluating
semi-elasticities.
Looking at both specifications, the computed results are statistically significant and
have the expected sign; in other words, an increase in gains to work increases the prob-
ability of participation both for males and females, while the opposite is true for non-la-
bour income. The key estimate of interest—the income semi-elasticity of a labour force
participation decision—is significantly larger for females than for males. A 1% rise in
gains to work increases individuals’ probability of economic activity by 0.12 and 0.08
percentage points for females and males, respectively. This effect is more pronounced
for net wages (see Eq. (11) for the analytical derivation). Our results show that the
own-wage semi-elasticity of the probability of participation yields 0.13 for females and
0.09 for males. Corresponding income elasticities9 can be obtained by dividing the
semi-elasticities by the average predicted probability of activity—these estimates yield
0.2 for females and 0.11 for males.
On the contrary, the effect of non-labour income on participation probability is com-
parable for both genders; a 1% increase in non-labour income leads to a decrease of
0.04 percentage points for both genders in supplying labour. Expressed in terms of
elasticities, these estimates provide −0.07 and −0.05 for females and males, respectively.
Next, we focused on selected subgroups of individuals and explored how estimated
semi-elasticities vary in magnitude. In Table 2, we present a comparison of marginal ef-
fects computed for the three educational subgroups (elementary [or less], secondary,
and tertiary education) on the prime-age subsample (25–49 years) and separately for
females and males. The estimated semi-elasticities are substantially different in terms of
educational subgroups: the highest responsiveness was observed in the low-educated
group with an elementary education (these individuals are often highly transfer
dependent). Our results suggest that participation semi-elasticities substantially de-
crease with the educational level for both genders. When comparing males and females,
the responsiveness of females in higher educated groups is two times higher compared
to that of males. Note that in agreement with previous studies, the prime-age subgroup
of higher educated males exhibits a low responsiveness overall.
In Table 3, we report the results for the subgroups classified by gender, age, and par-
ental status. Overall, the responsiveness of females is again higher than that of males.
Table 2 Marginal effects by educational subgroups and prime-age subsample
Females Males
dy/dx Std err dy/dx Std err
Elementary education, age 25–50
Gains to work (logGTW) 0.201 0.019 0.146 0.017
Non-labour income (logNY) −0.067 0.006 −0.065 0.006
Secondary education, age 25–50
Gains to work (logGTW) 0.108 0.010 0.053 0.006
Non-labour income (logNY) −0.036 0.003 −0.024 0.002
Tertiary education, age 25–50
Gains to work (logGTW) 0.099 0.010 0.047 0.006
Non-labour income (logNY) −0.033 0.003 −0.021 0.002
Note: Probit estimates are computed using full sample, and average marginal effects are evaluated at subgroups.
Bootstrapped standard errors, 5000 replications
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Prime-age males with small children under 3 years of age are identified as the subgroup
with the smallest semi-elasticity. On the contrary, females with small children are the
group with the highest responsiveness, being ten times higher than that of males in the
same category.
Overall, the presented results suggest that policies that make work pay would lead to
an increase in participation. The low-skilled and females are the groups that are more
responsive to changes in taxes and transfers. This implies that labour market policies,
namely tax and transfer system reforms that are aimed at boosting economic activity,
should be primarily targeted at low-educated individuals and women.
A comparison of estimates obtained for Slovakia to those published for neighbouring
countries can be found in Table 4. It appears that the magnitudes of Slovak estimates
are lower compared to those for Hungary or the Czech Republic (Benczur et al. 2014,
Galuscak and Katay, 2014), suggesting a lower sensitivity of individuals to changes in
labour and non-labour incomes. On the other hand, Bicakova et al. (2011) provided
Table 3 Marginal effects by selected subgroups
dy/dx Std err dy/dx Std err
Females, age 25–50 Males, age 25–50
Gains to work (logGTW) 0.109 0.010 Gains to work (logGTW) 0.056 0.006
Non-labour income (logNY) −0.036 0.003 Non-labour income (logNY) −0.025 0.002
Single females, age 25–50 Single males, age 25–50
Gains to work (logGTW) 0.123 0.012 Gains to work (logGTW) 0.085 0.010
Non-labour income (logNY) −0.041 0.004 Non-labour income (logNY) −0.038 0.004
Females w. child <3 years, age 25–50 Males w. child <3 years, age 25–50
Gains to work (logGTW) 0.236 0.023 Gains to work (logGTW) 0.021 0.005
Non-labour income (logNY) −0.078 0.007 Non-labour income (logNY) −0.010 0.002
Females, age 50+ Males, age 50+
Gains to work (logGTW) 0.108 0.010 Gains to work (logGTW) 0.080 0.009
Non-labour income (logNY) −0.036 0.003 Non-labour income (logNY) −0.035 0.003
Note: Probit estimates are computed using full sample, and average marginal effects are evaluated at subgroups.
Bootstrapped standard errors, 5000 replications
Table 4 Marginal effects: a comparison with neighbouring countries
Females Males All individuals
Slovakia (authors’ calculations)
Gains to work (logGTW) 0.12 0.08 0.10
Non-labour income (logNY) −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
Czech Republic (Bicakova et al. 2011)
Effective net wage 0.06 0.01
Other income −0.04 −0.01
Czech Republic (Galuscak and Katay 2014)
Gains to work 0.27
Non-labour income −0.10
Hungary (Benczur et al. 2014)
Gains to work 0.29
Non-labour income −0.30
Note: Average marginal effects (Slovakia); marginal effects at sample means (Czech Republic, Hungary)
Senaj et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:19 Page 15 of 26
estimates for the Czech Republic that are substantially smaller in magnitude for males
as well as for females. Estimates lie in the (rather wide) range of already published
labour supply elasticities. However, this comparison should only be taken as indicative
due to the differences in the methodologies used.
6.2 Tax reform scenario simulation
Using the SIMTASK microsimulation model and the model of labour force participa-
tion decision estimated above, we conducted a policy analysis of static and behavioural
effects of two tax system reforms. As a baseline, the tax and transfer system valid in
2012 in Slovakia was taken. We performed a microsimulation of two scenarios. Firstly,
we simulated the effects of adopting the legislation valid since January 2013, which
includes a marginal departure from the flat tax and results in higher revenues.
Secondly, we estimate the impact of a hypothetical abolition of the flat-tax regime with
the same simulated fiscal impact as in the first scenario. Although revenue-neutral sce-
narios are usually analysed in the academic literature, in our setup, we preferred to
simulate the reform with the same first-round fiscal effect that is directly comparable
with the first scenario.
The “2013 scenario” directly assessed the effect of recent changes in Slovak legisla-
tion, including the marginal deviation from a flat tax and a significant increase in social
security contributions. The two tax brackets of PIT were introduced so that incomes
were taxed at the 19% tax rate as before, and an additional 25% rate was applied to
those earnings exceeding a threshold value. The higher rate applies approximately to
the top 2% of earners. Moreover, this scenario includes a significant increase in the
maximum assessment base for social security and health care contributions as well as
an increase in the burden for income from agreement contracts. To solely assess the ef-
fects of changes in PIT legislation, government transfers and other system parameters
that enter the computations in SIMTASK (for example, the minimum subsistence level
and the minimum wage) were fixed to the level valid in 2012.
The “hypothetical scenario” simulated the effect of reintroducing the tax brackets that
were valid before the flat-tax reform in 2004. Five tax brackets with rates of 10, 20, 28,
35, and 38% were defined as in 2003; their thresholds were updated according to the
growth of the average nominal wage between 2003 and 2012. As this elementary setup
of tax rate regime would result in a decline in tax revenues, a further hypothetical
measure needed to be applied to make the fiscal effect of the reform comparable to the
2013 scenario. Specifically, the basic tax allowance is reduced by two thirds.
Firstly, we looked at the static or “day-after” effect of the two scenarios. In particular,
the change in individual tax burden and in households’ disposable income was assessed
under the assumption that people do not change their behaviour. The behavioural as-
pect was analysed afterwards using the estimates of the probit model of the labour
force participation decision.
Figures 3 and 4 depict the first-round effects of the analysed tax reforms in terms of
changes in individual marginal and average effective tax rates. It can be clearly seen
that simulated changes affect individuals across the whole income distribution in posi-
tive as well as negative ways. The variability arises mainly from various combinations of
incomes (labour and non-labour) and the fact that the individual income components
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might be considered differently in tax liability computations (in particular, the entitle-
ment to apply different tax allowances).
In the 2013 scenario, the individuals in the upper tail of the distribution face a
positive change in their marginal as well as their average effective tax rates. This is
mainly the result of an increase in the maximum assessment base for social secur-
ity and health care contributions. Individuals with income exceeding the pre-reform
values of the maximum assessment base pay higher contributions, which at the
same time decreases their tax liability. After the threshold of the new maximum
assessment base is reached, both effective tax rates are solely influenced by the
newly introduced second tax rate.
For most of the earners in the lower part of income distribution, the marginal and
average effective tax rates stay unaffected in the 2013 scenario. Effective tax rates in-
creased for those with income from agreement contracts, whose burden was affected
by legislation. While before the reform the incomes from agreement contracts10 were
only subject to a 1.05% rate to be paid for social insurance contributions and were
taxed at a rate of 19%, since 2013, the regular income from agreement contracts have
been burdened at the same rate as employment income. Additionally, due to tightened
Fig. 3 Simulated change in individual effective tax rates in scenario 2013
Fig. 4 Simulated change in individual effective tax rates in the hypothetical scenario
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eligibility conditions for spousal tax allowance valid from 2013, an increase in the tax
burden could be observed for affected individuals. On the other hand, a decrease in the
tax burden was identified for three small groups affected by the specific change in
legislation.
In the hypothetical scenario, the individuals in the upper tail of the distribution face a
positive change in their marginal and average effective tax rates, which is expected as
the tax rates for incomes in the second to fifth tax brackets increased while the decline
in the tax allowance additionally led to an increase in their burden.
A decline in effective tax rates was expected for low-income earners, being hypothet-
ically taxed at the 10% instead of the 19% rate. However, those with earnings below
the new basic tax allowance would have no tax liability after the deduction of the tax
allowance, similarly as in the baseline scenario. For those with earnings above the new
basic tax allowance, the effect of the lowered allowance prevails over the effect of the
lower tax rate, thus leading to an increase in the tax burden. The burden would
decrease mainly in those cases when the income is not eligible for a tax allowance de-
duction, e.g. in the case of working old-age pensioners or people with a prevailing
income from capital property.
These results can be contrasted to the findings of Krajcir and Odor (2005), who ana-
lysed the 2004 Slovak flat-tax reform. They showed that an increase in the non-taxable
allowance was an important factor that allowed the tax system to remain moderately
progressive and made the reform revenue-neutral, leading to a modest net income de-
crease for certain groups of workers with below average earnings.
Following this, the impact of legislative changes on labour supply behaviour was ana-
lysed. Using the SIMTASK microsimulation model, key income variables (gains to work
and non-labour income) were computed for the tax and transfers system setup valid in
the baseline and in the two scenarios. Given the semi-elasticities estimated by the
probit model of participation probability, we can quantify the extent of change by
comparing the probabilities of individuals’ participation decisions in the baseline and
the scenarios.
The individual responses to analysed tax regime changes, i.e. changes in the individ-
ual participation probabilities, are presented in Fig. 5. Individuals with a higher labour
income are less responsive to changes in the tax and welfare system despite the fact
that they face an increase both in the METR and AETR. In line with the literature as
well as our model estimates, suggesting that extensive margin decisions are taken at
the lower end of income distribution, Fig. 5 shows the highest changes in probabilities
for those earning less than the average wage.
Our approach allows us to compare the impact on participation probabilities for arbi-
trarily defined population subgroups, thus allowing us to assess to what extent they are
affected by the reform. The response in average participation probabilities of specific
subgroups in the two scenarios is reported in Table 5.
It turns out that the average probability of participation decreases only negligibly (by
0.05 percentage points) in the 2013 scenario. The detailed results suggest that the prob-
ability of participation would decrease for almost all of the selected subgroups. Low
earners (the first income quintile) and individuals with a lower education responded
with the highest magnitudes. This can be explained by pointing out that these individ-
uals often have income from agreement contracts (which after the reform were
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burdened more and in the same way as income from employment) or no labour
income at all. Individuals with either a low or no labour income but with a partner that
faced a drop in disposable income could as a family become recipients of the material
needs benefit or could have their material needs benefit increased. As a result, this
translates into a decrease in participation probability in the behavioural model. A posi-
tive reaction to legislation changes was identified among young people (15–24 years
old) and females with children under 3 years of age. Both of these groups are specific;
individuals frequently do not have a labour income (being students and mothers on
parental leave) and their own disposable income did not substantially change due to
Fig. 5 Simulated response in participation probabilities
Table 5 Simulated response in the average probabilities of participation
Baseline participation
probability in percent
Change of baseline in p.p.
Scenario 2013 Hypothetical scenario
Population 15–64 68.28 −0.05 −0.11
Age 15–24 39.63 0.03 −0.27
Age 25–50, female 76.26 −0.07 −0.18
Age 25–50, male 89.57 −0.06 −0.09
Age 50+ 60.97 −0.08 0.03
Female with child under 3 years, age 25–50 25.39 0.02 −0.18
Male with child under 3 years, age 25–50 96.40 −0.06 −0.01
Elementary education, age 25–50 66.60 −0.33 −0.27
Secondary education, age 25–50 84.51 −0.03 −0.14
Tertiary education, age 25–50 82.28 −0.10 −0.11
Gross wage quintile—Q1 (below 315 euro),
age 25–50
62.31 −0.45 −0.31
Gross wage quintile—Q2 (below 538 euro),
age 25–50
85.43 0.13 −0.46
Gross wage quintile—Q3 (below 731 euro),
age 25–50
92.33 −0.14 0.00
Gross wage quintile—Q4 (below 1005 euro),
age 25–50
94.58 −0.11 0.00




Senaj et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:19 Page 19 of 26
the simulated reform. In the behavioural model, the average participation probability in
these groups increased mainly due to the lower disposable income of other working
family members.
In the hypothetical scenario, the average probability of labour market participation
would decrease by 0.11 percentage points. Similarly to the previous scenario, the de-
tailed results show no special pattern among particular subgroups. A positive response
was observed for persons over 50 years of age. This is influenced by the fact that old-
age pensioners would not be worse off by a lowered tax allowance but would benefit
from a significant decrease in the tax rate. On the other hand, young individuals would
decrease their labour participation by 0.27 percentage points. The same applies for the
level of income earned. Low earners with high values of estimated participation elastici-
ties are more responsive to changes to the tax system than those people with higher
earnings. The individuals belonging to the third and fourth quintile would not change
their participation decision under the simulated tax system.
For policymakers, it is of crucial importance to assess the distributional impacts of every
proposed tax change. The fundamental question that may arise here is which subgroups
of the population would benefit and which would lose after the reform. Table 6 presents
the income inequality measures for the analysed scenarios. For both scenarios, the
changes in the disposable income of households are simulated, and as a result, the income
inequality measures can be compared in two states (before and after the reform).
The impacts of the simulated scenarios differ in terms of income inequality. The Gini co-
efficient, which is the most commonly used measure of inequality, suggests a slight increase
in inequality in the 2013 scenario. The reason is that this tax change would increase the tax
wedge for agreement contracts, which are located in the lower deciles of the income distri-
bution and among couples with a lower income. On the other hand, the implementation of
the hypothetical scenario would decrease income inequality. This would result from a com-
bination of new tax rates and a substantial decrease in tax allowances.
A more detailed insight into inequality impacts is offered by income share ratios
(S90/S10, S80/S20, and S60/S40). We documented that the income share of the top
10% of the population compared to the income share of the bottom 10% would in-
crease in both scenarios. The S90/S10 ratio would increase from 4.85 to 5.34 in the
2013 scenario and to 5.20 in the hypothetical scenario. Like the change in the Gini
coefficient, the S80/S20 ratio would indicate a decrease in inequality for the hypothet-
ical scenario. The simulated decrease in the S80/S20 ratio for the 2013 scenario is
counterintuitive. Having in mind a slight increase in the Gini coefficient, we would
Table 6 Impact on income inequality
Baseline index Scenario indices
Scenario 2013 Hypothetical scenario
Gini index 24.52 24.59 24.19
S90/S10 ratioa 4.85 5.34 5.20
S80/S20 ratio 3.60 3.51 3.54
S60/S40 ratio 2.34 2.35 2.32
Source: authors’ calculations
aInter-decile income share ratios are the ratios of total income received by the top 10, 20, or 40% of the population to
that received by the bottom 10, 20 or 40%. Measures are based on disposable household income and equalized by the
modified OECD equivalence scale
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have expected the opposite effect. Finally, if we compare the top 40% and the bottom
40% of the population, the income shares would remain stable after the implementation
of either scenario.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the elasticity with respect to a unique tax reform in Slovakia
whereby the flat tax was backtracked and replaced by a progressive tax. We used a
labour supply model that takes into account both taxes and transfers to estimate the
semi-elasticities of labour force participation decisions. The advantage of this model is
in its ability to conduct an ex ante analysis of changes in the tax and welfare system. As
an interesting case study, a move away from the flat-tax system which had been valid
in Slovakia until 2012 was analysed.
In particular, a probit model for labour force participation decisions was estimated,
and the results were extensively discussed. This analysis shows several clear results. We
identify a significant individual responsiveness to changes in labour and non-labour in-
come. It turns out that the results are qualitatively comparable to those reported for
mature market economies as well as for neighbouring countries in the region (the
Czech Republic and Hungary): the highly responsive groups of the population are the
low-skilled and females. Therefore, labour market policies aimed at boosting economic
activity should concentrate on increasing marginal gains to work, especially for low-
educated individuals and women. We performed a policy analysis of the first-round
and behavioural effects of two scenarios. Both of them simulate the departure from the
flat-tax system valid in 2012. However, the setup and the details of the two scenarios
differed. The simulations of both scenarios confirmed that the responsiveness of labour
supply to legislative changes was marginal for people with high earnings. On the con-
trary, the highest changes in participation probabilities were faced by individuals with
below average earnings.
By simulating the two different tax reform scenarios, we demonstrated that the
departures from the flat-tax regime with the same fiscal revenue effect have a com-
parable impact on the average probability of participation. However, the impacts
on selected subgroups are different. In the case of real reform in 2013, an increase
in tax revenues was accompanied by a slight decrease in the average probability of
being economically active by 0.05 percentage points. Individuals with agreement
contracts, for whom the tax burden increased significantly, were prominent among
the discouraged. In the second scenario, which simulated a hypothetical departure
from the flat-tax system by reintroducing five tax brackets together with a signifi-
cant reduction in the basic tax allowance, labour participation probability was
shown to decrease by 0.11 percentage points. The most discouraged groups here
would be low earners, individuals with a lower level of education, and women.
Finally, we showed that the two simulated scenarios also differed in terms of their
consequences for income inequality.
Endnotes
1Reform has been set up as revenue-neutral; see Brook and Leibfritz (2005). Due to
data limitations, no quantitative evaluation of this reform has been reported.
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2The notation is based on the model presented by Benczur et al. (2014).
3Let us assume that the utility function is an additively separable CES function con-
sidered in the form c
1−ψ−1
1−ψ þχ 1−lð Þ
1−Φ−1
1−Φ .
4This is also justified in the underlying SK-SILC survey. Less than 2% of respondents
in 2012 defined their economic status as “working part time”.
5In Heckman’s framework, the model consists of two equations: selection and regres-
sion. In our implementation, the wage equation contains the degree of urbanization of
a region where a person resides (dummy) and regional dummy variables (eight regions).
These two variables are intended to capture differences in the regional economic envir-
onment and thus present a control for the activity indirectly. In addition, we include
human capital characteristics, such as a quadratic form of years of experience and three
educational groups. The group of exclusion restrictions consists of characteristics that
affect the probability of being employed with the assumption that they have no direct
effect on gross wages. These include other forms of income available in the household,
the quadratic form of age, and unfavourable health conditions. Controls for family sta-
tus include dummies like being a parent of a child (younger/older than 3 years of age).
We also set a control for having a working partner and being single, married, or
divorced. Finally, dummies as a control for working students and pensioners were also
included. The estimated coefficients were mostly in line with findings that can be found
in the literature; we found a statistically significant effect of selection. The detailed esti-
mation results are available upon request.
6Our approach to the construction of the GTW variable differs from the setup used
by Benczur et al. (2014) and by Galuscak and Katay (2014). They constructed GTW
(using the microsimulation tool) for workers and estimate GTW using the Heckman
selection model for non-workers.
7Income semi-elasticity (η) of labour force participation is defined as
η ¼ ∂Pr activityð Þ ¼ 1∂GTW  GTW , implying that the marginal effect of wages on the
probability of economic activity can be expressed as MFX ¼ ∂ Pr activity ¼ 1ð Þ∂ logGTW ¼ γ
φ γ logGTW − ψ logNY þ Ζ0αð Þ , where φ(∙) denotes the standard normal density
function. The estimated effect should be interpreted so that a 1% rise in gains
to work leads to the increase of the probability of supplying labour by 0.01 ×
MFX.
8The income elasticity (ε) of labour force participation is defined as
ε ¼ ∂Pr activity ¼ 1ð Þ∂GTW  GTWPr activity ¼ 1ð Þ and can be calculated as ε ¼ ηPr activity ¼ 1ð Þ ,
knowing the values of semi-elasticity η and predicted probability of activity Pr(activity = 1).
9The income elasticity (ε) of labour force participation is defined as
ε ¼ ∂Pr activity¼1ð Þ∂W  WPr activity ¼ 1ð Þ and can be calculated as ηPr activity ¼ 1ð Þ ,
knowing the values of semi-elasticity η and predicted probability of activity
Pr(activity = 1).
10Agreement contracts were a popular form of temporary employment contract be-
fore the reform in 2013. In our estimation sample (related to the pre-reform period
from 2010 to 2012), a higher share of individuals with this type of contract were ob-
served in the subsample of students, among females, and among younger age cohorts.
Detailed descriptive statistics is available upon request.
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Appendix
Table 7 List of variables
Active Binary indicator that equals 1 if the person is economically active in the
income reference period.
Employed Binary indicator that equals 1 if the person is employed in the income
reference period.
Gains to work (logGTW) Variable defined as annual net wage minus the difference between social
benefits if not working and social benefits if working.
Non-labour income (logNY) Variable defined as a sum of two components, namely non-labour income
of all household members (for example, pensions, income from property,
parental allowance, unemployment benefit, dividend payments) and labour
income of other members of the household.
Female Binary variable that equals 1 if the person is woman, 0 if man.
Age Variable indicating the person’s age.
Years of work experience Variable representing the person’s work experience in years.
Education group dummies 3 binary variables are created based on ISCED classification (EDU: primary
[reference cat.], EDU: secondary, EDU: tertiary). If the person belongs to a
group according to his highest degree awarded, the corresponding binary
variable equals 1, otherwise 0.
Chronic disease Binary indicator that equals to 1 if the person reports a chronic/long-standing
disease.
Parent with child under 3 years Binary indicator that equals to 1 if the person is a parent of a child that
is younger than 3 years.
Parent with child over 3 years Binary indicator that equals to 1 if the person is a parent of a child that
is over 3 years old.
Student Binary indicator that equals to 1 if the person is a student, 0 otherwise.
Pensioner Binary indicator that equals to 1 if the person is a pensioner, 0 otherwise.
Working partner Person has a working partner.
Married Binary indicator that equals to 1 if the person is married, 0 otherwise.
Separated, divorced, or
widowed
Binary indicator that equals to 1 if the person is separated, divorced, or
widowed, 0 otherwise.
Degree of urbanization 3 binary variables are created based on the number of inhabitants of the
area where the person resides (dense [reference category], average, sparse).
If the person belongs to a group according to the degree of urbanization
of his residence, the corresponding dummy variable equals 1, otherwise 0.
Regional dummies 8 binary variables are created based on NUTS3 classification (REG: Bratislava
[reference cat.], REG: Trnava, REG: Trencin, REG: Nitra, REG: Zilina, REG: Banska
Bystrica, REG: Presov, REG: Kosice). If the person belongs to a group, the
corresponding binary variable equals 1, otherwise 0.
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Table 8 Descriptive statistics of the estimation subsample and original SK-SILC 2010–2012
Dataset Subsample for estimation SK-SILC 2010–2012
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Active 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
Employed 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
Gains to work (in euros, monthly) 519.2 168.6 437.6 237.4
Log of gains to work 6.2 0.3 6.1 0.5
Non-labour income (in euros, monthly) 1110.3 632.1 1133.4 633.9
Log of non-labour income 6.8 0.6 6.9 0.6
Male 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Female 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Education: primary 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4
Education: secondary 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5
Education: tertiary 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4
Age 42.4 16.5 39.9 21.0
Years of experience 19.0 14.8 17.4 15.5
Chronic disease 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4
Parent with child under 3 years 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2
Parent with child over 3 years 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4
Pensioner 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4
Student 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3
Working partner 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5
Family: married 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5
Family: separated, divorced, or widowed 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
Density: dense 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4
Density: average 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5
Density: sparse 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Region: Bratislava 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
Region: Trnava 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
Region: Trencin 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
Region: Nitra 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
Region: Zilina 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
Region: Banska Bystrica 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
Region: Presov 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4
Region: Kosice 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4
Sample size 37,960 46,191
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